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ROGER C. WESLEY*

Problems in Regulating the
Multinational EnterpriseAn Overview
As the world slowly emerges from its worst recession in thirty years, it has
become painfully evident that no nation-state rich or strong is insulated from
the actions of its neighbors. Ours is a global economy. "Recessions, inflation,
trade relations, monetary stability, gluts and scarcities of products and materials . . . are international phenomena" affecting all national participants. The

realities of economic life push toward global interdependence, discrediting in
the process outgrown concepts of economic determinism. I
Reconciling the competing goals of the developed and developing community
demands concerted commitment to development from all sectors. A principal
engine of development is the multinational enterprise, an economic burgeoning
of the last two decades, whose wealth and influence now rival many nationstates. The control which they exert over pressure groups and markets has
enabled MNEs to affect political and economic processes of host countries in
a dramatic way. 2 Fundamental problems have surfaced in recent years as a
result of the growing internationalization of production carried out by MNEs.
Inevitably, questions arose as to the proper role of the MNE and what restraints, if any, should be placed on it to make it a more effective instrument
of international trade.
The international community is situated at an important cross-roads: It may
continue to endure economic dislocations resultant from deficient institutional
mechanisms for coordinating the public/private sectors, or it may develop new
and more equitable standards of conduct under which both governments and
*B.S., M.A., University of Southern California; J.D., George Washington University; Member of
the California Bar.
'From Secretary of State Kissinger's address on global consensus and economic development,
delivered by Daniel Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the Seventh Special
Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 1, 1975. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1538 (1976).
'For comparison of host country attitudes among LDCs, see J. HANTSHORN, OIL COMPANIES AND
GOVERNMENTS (2d ed. 1967); J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 114-27 (1970); V. ALBA, THE LATIN AMERICANS 217-29 (1969); R. VERNON, How
LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE UNITED STATES INVESTOR 20 (1966); Anand, Attitudes of the AsianAfrican State Towards Certain Problems ofInternationalLaw, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1966).

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4

614

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

enterprises operate harmoniously. 3 While a good deal of time and energy have
been devoted to confronting the multinational's special situation, most efforts
have been confined to individual countries and regional bodies such as the
Andean Community, OECD and EEC, or to particular subjects. Little energy
has been spent on the broader issue of bringing the MNE into alignment with
the development interests of the international community at large. The United
Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, and other international
bodies, have recently commenced such efforts. Principles of conduct must
reflect the interests of all participants concerned. On the capacity of the international community to achieve working principles may well hang the balance
of future economic development.
The role of the multinational corporation has been the subject of discussions
and study groups in numerous international organizations." The Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been involved in the
development of principles of conduct and/or guidelines for MNEs. UNCTAD
has established an ad hoc group on restrictive business practices similar to a
long-standing group under the auspices of the OECD. There are other organizations which have been devoting their energies to the problem of the MNE: The
UN Commission on International Trade Law and the International Labor
Organization are two such examples. Even more significant perhaps is the work
of the Group of Eminent Persons Commissioned by the UN to study MNEs. The
commission has made the formulation of a code of conduct for MNEs a matter
of high priority. SOf special concern to the Commission were questions regarding
the extra-territorial application of local laws and the applicability of international norms. Major disagreements occurred, however, on the force to be
attached to any code of conduct viz., whether the code should be obligatory with
penalties for non-observance or merely of persuasive force. 6
Regional organizations of LDCs have also shown a special interest in prospective codes of conduct for MNEs. The Permanent Council of the Organization
of American States has followed the work of the UN Commission and the InterAmerican Judicial Committee in exploring the feasibility of a code of conduct. 7
The OECD has been especially instrumental of recent in launching an inter'Some favor the combined sharing of both power and ownership of MNCs and their subsidiaries.
See e.g., J. Behrman, InternationalDivestment: Panaceaor Pitfall, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION 467 486-88 (A. Kapoor & P. Grubb eds. 1972); Vernon, The Multinational
Enteprise: Power Versus Sovereignty, 49 FoREIGN AFF. 736, 744 (1971). But compare M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 258 (1972).
For discussion, see Rubin, Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on TransnationalCorporations, 70 AJIL 73, 89 (1976).
'See REPORT OF U.N. COMMISSbON ON TRANSNATIONAL CoRPoRATIONs approved by commission at conclusion of its meeting of March 17-28, 1975 (U.N. Doc. E/5655; E./C 10/6). (hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF COMMISSION.)
'Id.
'Resolution adopted July 10, 1975, Permanent Council Res. 154 (167/75), Corr. 1.
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governmental framework designed to enrich the investment relationships of
MNEs with member countries affected.' The OECD blueprint is cast in the
form of a declaration of policy and guidelines. Despite the voluntary hue of
these guidelines, they represent a considerable achievement in international
efforts to harmonize MNE operations through intergovernmental cooperation. 9
Policy considerations from the standpoint of the MNE were diverse: regard for
country development, observance of legal obligations, local cooperation and
insulation from bribery and illegal political contribution received major attention. 10 Specific guidelines were addressed to the activities of MNEs on such
subjects as information disclosure, competition, financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations and science and technology." The presence of
voluntary compliance probably best explains the general parameters of these
guidelines.
New Substantive Guidelines
There is no consensus on what areas should be included in a code of conduct
let alone whether such a code should be obligatory with penalties for nonobservance or merely of persuasive moral force. This symposium seeks to deal
with some of the most troublesome of these areas.
A. Taxation
Improved tax apportionment 'has long been an area of pressing concern to
nation-states and MNEs alike. Multinational corporations are subject to varying tax laws, framed primarily to serve domestic needs, but with little regard
for the most effective allocation of worldwide resources. I2 There are presently
no international standards for defining a home country or income and deductible allowances. Both rates of corporate taxes and the treatment of income
taxation vary widely among both developed and developing countries. Some
countries, for instance, tax both corporate and shareholder income. Others
apply reduced rates on corporate income, or sometimes the shareholders themselves with due regard to taxes paid at the corporate level. The employment of
flat rates on remittances to non-residents is still another device employed by
various countries. 13
More serious problems are posed even in structuring international tax
policies. There are, for instance, presently no principles of equity as to revenue'See OECD Press Release, Press 1 A (76) 20 (Paris June 21, 1976).
'Member countries were also asked to assume major policy responsibilities as well. To further
cooperative relations amongst the member countries with MNEs in connection with the guidelines,
appropriate review and consultation procedures were targeted. Id., at 7.
"Id., at 7-8.
"Id., at 8-12.
"See REPORT OF CoMMIssIoN, supra, note 5, paras. 41-50.
"The United States, for instance, taxes nonresident aliens a flat rate of 30 percent on dividends,
interest, royalties, etc. received on a regular basis. 26 U.S.C. § 871.
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sharing among nations. In counterpoise to equitable principles which treat
similar businesses non-discriminatively for tax purposes, regardless of the locus
of ownership, some countries, such as the United States, strive to tax their
nationals at their source, making no distinction between income earned abroad
or at home. Neither approach promotes optimum allocation of tax revenues:
one extreme method (income is taxed only where it originates) is often matched
against the other extreme (taxation of worldwide profits).14 Some countries in
the latter grouping do, to be sure, provide for foreign tax creditsIs or in some
cases, limit taxation to repatriated earnings. At present, however, such policies
are unilateral only unless secured by bilateral treaty arrangements. 16 And they
are, moreover, sometimes circumvented by practices of channeling income into
countries which either provide tax havens for MNE holding companies" or
offer tax holidays as investment incentives to MNEs.' s Furthermore, tax incentives granted by host developing countries to attract capital are often nullified by home countries which subject MNEs to even higher taxation, refuse
to credit taxes spared under host country tax incentive programs19 or limit
deduction of expenses from the foreign operations of an MNE.2 While tax
treaties have become popular devices for eliminating dual taxation, there are
at present too few of such treaties.2"
"See REPORT OF COMMISSION, supra, note 5, para. XI.
'In the effort to eliminate abuses in the U.S. tax laws by the big oil companies wrought from
OPEC structuring of posted pricing policies, Congress added a new provision to the 1975 Internal
Revenue Code. The provision specifies that taxes paid to any foreign country in connection with the
extraction of oil or gas are not income taxes when (a) the tax payer holds no economic interest in the
oil and gas, and (b) the price upon which the tax is based is not the fair market price. 26.U.S.C.
§ 901 (f. By treating oil company payments to OPEC governments as royalties instead of taxes, oil
company retention of income after imposition of U.S. taxes will be substantially reduced.
6
See REPORT OF COMMISSION, supra, note 5, XI.
"Most countries do not tax foreign income until it is repatriated to the parent country. Others
still employ old territorial concepts which result in no taxation of the MNE. Pro rata allocation of
the MNE's world-wide income was rejected by the U.N. Commission in its report as a solution to
the problem. See REPORT OF COMMISSION, supra, note 5, para. XI. Recognizing some need for tax
havens to avoid double taxation from incidences of high host country tax credits, the U.N. Commission recommended instead a modified accrual system. For discussion of the tax haven problem,
see Burge, Current Trends in the Taxation of MultinationalEnterprises, 52 TAXEs 746, 747 (1974).
"Tax holidays are most utilized by LDCs in acute need of foreign investment to further their
industrial development schemes.
"'ocite just one example, the United States Senate has been reluctant to approve treaties with
LDCs which provide for tax credits for taxes spared under LDC incentive programs. The U.N.
Group has recommended such policies be reconsidered in the interest of furthering development
objectives. See REPORT OF COMMISSION, supra, note 5, at XI.
"'The United States Treasury, for instance, is apparently still considering its published proposals
to subject a greater allocation of deductible expenses to income earned from the foreign operations
of American-based MNEs. For comment on the proposed regulations, see REPORT OF COMMISSION
ON DEDUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN INCOME, N.Y. State Bar Assoc., Tax Section, Proposals for
Improvement of Rules of Allocation ofDeductions Between Foreign and U.S. Source Income-A
Report on Section 1.861-8 of the ProposedRegulations (Issued on June 18, 1973], 29 TAx L. REv.
610, 625-26 (1974).
"At present the United States has treaties of this kind in force with 23 countries. An additional 11
countries are covered by treaties which became effective while they were territories of either the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4

Problems in Regulating the MultinationalEnterprise

617

It seems only too clear that improved tax coordination is needed among host
countries affected by the activities of MNEs. 2 There are pros and cons to both
the worldwide earnings accrual test used by the United States and the remittance test which will require further study. The worldwide earnings test, for
instance, encourages low tax countries to increase their taxes on affiliates of
MNEs to the level of capital-exporting countries. The remittance test, on the
other hand, tends to grant too much leverage to MNEs in exacting tax concessions. Tax reform, for certain, will not be easy.
B. Securities
Acutely difficult problems lie in wait for any serious attempts to internationalize the regulation of the world's security markets. The expansion of multinational trade, the increase in securities legislation in foreign countries, and
the emergence of the MNE as a supranational entity all converge to make some
form of improved international securities regulation necessary. At core is the
extra-territorial reach of national securities laws seen occasionally in the United
States. 23 Unilateral imposition of United States laws and standards on other
countries can have an adverse impact on foreign investment." ' Discourse and
United Kingdom or Belgium, while some 25 territories are still covered by treaties with Australia,
Canada, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. For a detailed breakdown of these
treaties, see 2 RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS, § 6.08 (1975).
Such treaties generally assist foreign corporations in a number of ways. Foreign corporations
engaged in a trade or business in the United States are subject to U.S. taxation unless protected
by a treaty. 26 U.S.C. § 882. See, generally, S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, U.S. INCOME TAXATION
OF FOREIGN CoRPO.ATIoNs AND NONRESIDENT ALIENS, § IX/5, at IX 31-35 (1971).
"See Kissinger Address, note 1, supra.
"Actually, the history of extra-territorial application of the United States Securities Laws is
somewhat checquered. The extra-territorial reach of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Securities
Act have, for instance, been upheld where U.S. investors are adversely affected and the jurisdictional means are utilized between the United States and a foreign country. See e.g., Schoenbaum v.
Fishbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 1960). The reverse has generally been true where the transaction involves only foreigners. See Investment Properties Int'l Ltd. v. 1OS Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L.
83,001 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd in part 458 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
REP. ['70'71 Transfer Binder]
1972). But compare, SEC v. Gulf International Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (SD Fla. 1963).
Extra-territorial application of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act has been even less consistent. It
has been applied to several foreign companies where sufficient contacts of officers and directors in
the United States were found. CF. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ['72-'73
Transfer Binder] 292, 885, Civil No. 72-155 (E.D. Pa., June 7, 1972). In 1973 the SEC took the
position, though, that foreign companies not listed on U.S. exchanges and with inconsequential
trading on U.S. over-the-counter markets enjoy limited exemption under Section 12(h) of the 1934
Act from reporting requirements under Section 15(d) of the Act. See Exchange Act Release No.
10168 re: Lake Ontario Crest Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP, (1973 Transfer Binder) 1 83,111, May
23, 1973. The Supreme Court, furthermore, has upheld an international contractual provision
calling for third-party arbitration in France by the ICC, notwithstanding the American status of
Alberto Culver, the corporate disputant, and alleged violations of l0b-S of the 1934 act and regulations promulgated therein in connection with Alberto's acquisition of a German cosmetics firm.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
"The issue of extra-territorial reach of the U.S. securities laws can probably be expected to turn
on the locus of contacts of the securities transaction. Where the transaction is adjudged to be
predominantly foreign, as in F.O.F. Propreitary Funds, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., Ltd. Doc No.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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understanding is sorely needed. From such a modest beginning will hopefully
emerge harmonization and cooperation in the administration of national
securities laws which could ultimately provide a framework for eventual supranational regulation.
C. Labor
Coordination of international labor movements to deal effectively with the
global strategies of MNEs are also treated in this part of the symposium. Sharp
disputes too often have confronted MNEs in their efforts to extend United
States labor practices to their international subsidiaries. What action, if any,
for instance, should be taken to counter MNE flexibility in shifting production
facilities from one country to another? Is the problem ever significant enough
for action? Capital intensive industries, for example, make short-run operations
difficult, to say the least. But if relocations are made, what notice requirements
to employees should be imposed? Should governments allow sympathy strikes
of workers employed by affiliates in other countries? And how can labor benefited imports be reconciled with the adverse effects they might occasion to labor
in the exporting country? Then there is the larger problem of reconciling the
internationalization of labor vis-a-vis MNEs with the possible conflicts that may
arise with nation-states and their labor codes. These questions and more are
assessed in the final article of the symposium appearing in this issue. Problems
related to pressure from the trade union movement, particularly in the United
States and Sweden, decentralization of industrial relations matters among the
host countries of the various affiliates of the MNE, multinational objections
to trade union demands for recognition, variations in bargaining practices
among host countries and trade union concern with MNE investment decisions
all are examined.
The world's readiness for an international labor code may be nothing more
than a distant fantasy. Thoughtful attention to the heavy pressures confronting
the MNE and its labor relations in the host countries it operates in is elemental,
however, to any serious attempts to reconciling the MNE with global development goals.
D. OtherAreas of Substantive Concern
Any effective code of conduct for MNEs, whether implemented by voluntary
observance or enforcement machinery, will require consideration of other
important areas as well. Antitrust, export controls and currency transfers have
generated particular concern, both of which will be treated in Part Two.

73 Civ. 3262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95, 296 (1975), subject matter jurisdiction
will in all likelihood be denied.
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Concentration, market allocation and abusive arrangements in transfer
pricing pose critical issues for international trade relationships. The size and
influence of MNEs in world markets make them especially effective in dominating and combatting potential competition through their affiliates. Antitrust
regulation is not, to be sure, confined to the United States: It is now common
practice in Europe and Japan. Even Mexico has felt constrained to take national
action to control excessive foreign concentration and other market abuses.
Dilemmas are posed, however, in bringing anticompetitive practices of MNEs
under acceptable limits in the absence of international agreement. At the center
of the quandary lies the often conflicting local policies for controlling anticompetitive conduct. Some host countries, notably Mexico, control only the
actions of foreign affiliates, while others such as the United States, West
Germany, Japan and the EEC, and more recently the state oil cartels of the
OPEC countries, initiate extra-territorial application without regard to the
impact on other countries. Reconciliation of these competing policies would
seem improbable without international agreement.
Market allocation is another sore spot, particularly in developing countries.
MNEs commonly restrict the export markets of their affiliates through various
forms of restrictive licensing agreements on patents and other types of technology. To counter these practices, many LDCs have undertaken screening
measures to eliminate tied purchase clauses and export licensing restrictions.
Accommodation might require some international coordination or regulation to
ensure that licensing restrictions are justified by commensurate local benefits.
Transfer pricing abuses is still another problem which may characterize
MNEs and their affiliates. In simplest terms, it is a method of price manipulation between the MNE and its affiliates (referred to as intracompany pricing
to achieve tax or other fiscal advantages) as well as with outside suppliers or
customers. Motivated by such internal considerations as apparent profit reduction of a particular affiliate, improvement of wage bargaining with local labor
units or the allocation of markets of affiliates subject to high government royalty
requirements and such external factors as varying rates of tax assessment
among countries, differences in the tax treatment of remittance, variations in
exchange controls (e.g., 14 percent in Andean countries), and exchange rate
and nationalization risks, an MNE may often find it profitable to vary the price
factor between affiliates in its system. To counter the resourcefulness of MNEs,
the lack of data and inability to compel data disclosure, perhaps internationally
sanctioned disclosure rules are necessary to ensure arm's-length dealing.
Despite the intrusive nature of disclosure rules some disclosure seems almost
mandatory to any effective policing of MNE pricing policies. These and other
problems to be encountered in efforts to bring MNEs under increased
coordination if not regulation of their trade relationships will be examined.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
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The area of export controls, another hotly contested subject, will be appraised
in Part Two of the present symposium. The role of export control laws, particularly the United States Trading with the Enemy Act 2" and other United
States export control laws, with their effect on the MNE and international
trade, will be explored as well as the reaction to such laws by the international
community. Of special interest because of the debate regarding nuclear exports
is a discussion of the current legal framework for nuclear exports and nuclear
non-proliferation.
Currency transfers by MNEs has been still another source of controversy and
will be assessed in Part Two.
The reasons for currency restrictions in host countries can often be attributed
to MNEs themselves. A common practice of MNEs is to transfer excess cash
in one country (referred to as the "float" accumulated in a company's system)
to a troubled subsidiary in another. Intracompany accounts have been particularly advantageous as well in moving weak currents in particularly volatile
areas into strong currency financial centers.
Reconciliation of currency transfer abuses within an international framework
of investment coordination between host and investor countries can remove a
major obstacle to more productive and harmonious trade relationships. Abusive
currency practices of MNEs have spurred tighter monetary restrictions which
more often tend to hinder the development process, discouraging needed longterm investment. 6 Some currency shifts are, of course, motivated by defensive
factors (protecting against local currency changes) as opposed to offensive
oriented currency speculation.27 The former can usually be economically and
politically justified; the latter cannot. Speculative short-term investment disrupts balance of payment parities, with the results usually reflected in vacillating convertibility between official and underlying market rates. While
national restrictions have alleviated some of the pressures of foreign reserves
in LDCs, they probably do more to inhibit development from sources in the
private sector. A new set of internationally coordinated disclosures rules could
perhaps prove an effective deterrent to intracompnay currency speculation.
Other substantive areas might appropriately be dealt with in any code of
conduct for multinationals. Dumping and countervailing duties have been used
by both developed and developing countries, often in retaliation, and generally
"5Enacted in 1917, essentially as a war-time measure, the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106,
§ 1, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), granted wide powers to the president to deal with transactions involving
the property of enemy nationals.
"REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS TO STUDY THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, submitted to U.N.

Economic and Social Council at its 57th Session on May 24, 1974. (U.N. Doc. E/5500/Add. 1 (Part
i), I V.
"See S. ROBBINS & R. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF
FINANCIAL POLICY 185-87 (1973).
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in derogation of global trade objectives. The establishment of uniform international rules may afford the best solution. So, too, accounting standards and
participation criteria warrant attempts to obtain international consensus.
Consumer protection against false advertising, political interference in the
domestic activities of host countries, protection of the environment, contract
observance, discriminatory investment policies of host countries and their effect
on MNEs and the effects of MNE operations and activities on the social and
cultural identities of host countries are other areas of obvious substantive
concern to MNE and nation-states which are affected by their presence. 28 Unfortunately, space does not permit their treatment in this symposium.
New Dispute Procedures
Implementation of any substantive code of conduct will inevitably be visited
by disputes. Difficult problems can be foreseen in the enforcement of multinational principles exclusively in local fora. Whether the same form of thirdparty dispute procedures can be established remains to be seen. The Latin
American Calvo clause and other types of local jurisdictional requirements
remain as entrenched as ever in Western Hemisphere LDCs. Only recently,
local jurisdictional principles were reaffirmed by the Latin American and Carribean nations during the January 13-17, 1975 meetings in Washington of the
Third Preparatory Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics.2"
And a draft outline of a proposed code of conduct on transfer of technology
submitted to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board similarly reaffirmed
that local law be controlling unless otherwise excepted. 30 Other organizational
groups have recommended similar jurisdictional restraints. The United Nations
General Assembly, for example, has again acknowledged the right of individual
states to regulate foreign investment and transnational corporations" in accordance with their respective laws, rules and regulations.32 The Permanent
Council of the OAS followed suit in adopting its resolution for a code of conduct
2
These were some of the areas of concern expressed by the group of developed countries to the
U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations. See REPORT OF COMMISSION, supra, note 5,
Ann. II.
2
'These principles are outlined in Annex I of the Report of the Commission. See, note 5, supra.
3
The LDC Group's proposals were made at Geneva on May 16, 1975 and are contained in Annex
III of the Report of the Commission. See note 5, supra. The proposals were circulated in U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C. 6/AC. 1/L.lRev. 1, on May 16, 1975 and are reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1329,
1333, 1344 (1975). The Group's proposals essentially embraced a similar resolution of the OAS.
"While the term transnational enterprise is used, the term differs from multinational enterprise
as that term is normally used only in the degree of diffusion of the enterprise as a whole. Contextually, MNEs were clearly included within the purview of "transnational corporations." See Rubin,
supra, note 4, at 84-85.
"See CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, Art. 2, 19 UNGA Res. 3281,
adopted Jan. 15, 1975, PROCEEDINGS OF UNCTAD, Third Session, Vol. 1, Report and Annexes
(U.N. Doc. E. 73. II, D.4), annex I.A.
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for MNEs. 33 Neutral fora seem clearly needed, though, to complement new sets
of international guidelines. Reserved for further pursuit might be the proposals
of Secretary Kissinger for more concerted use of fact-finding and third-party
arbitration put forth at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly. The secretary's recommendations for more equitable procedural arrangements represent just one of a number of specific suggestions designed
to improve coordination between host countries and transnational enterprises
so as to make such enterprises more effective instruments in the world's trading
system. Implementation of third-party dispute proceedings face tough resistance.
Conclusion
At present the world community lacks national and international institutions
to deal adequately with the transnational character of multinational corporations. The future of trade developments may well depend on the international
community's resolve to harness and coordinate more effectively the activities
of the MNE. This may or may not require the development of regulatory and
disclosure mechanisms to ensure more compliant attention to competitive
markets, price manipulation, securities' coordination, trade unions, etc. Such
mechanisms, may be particularly apposite in LDCs whose institutional checks
and balances may not be sufficiently advanced to cope with the particular
capabilities of large MNEs. The papers which follow explore various problems
in regulating and coordinating the activities of MNEs in the important areas of
taxation, securities and labor. Other important substantive subjects (antitrust,
export controls and currency transfers) along with possible new procedural
mechanisms to deal with more effective multinational coordination will follow
in Part Two.

"See note 7, supra.
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